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Ideas and Interests: 
Businessmen and the Interstate Commerce Act 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR. 
HISTORIANS have generally seen the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 
as the first major step on the road to federal regulation of business. While 
much of the rhetoric of American politics painted the issue in terms of ''the 
people" or "the farmers" against "business," scholars have long been 
aware of the inadequacy of that view. Rather than opposing all government 
regulation, businessmen were of ten involved in sponsoring and supporting 
such legislation. Within the last two decades historians have published sev-
eral important studies concerning the origin and purpose of the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887. Lee Benson, studying the New York State move-
ment toward regulation of the roads, was able to delineate the impact of 
railroad development on various economic interest groups in the state and 
explain the conflict generated among them. He focused mainly on mer-
chants, especially those in New York City, and their fight for more favor-
able freight rates. "New York merchants," he concluded, "constituted the 
single most important group behind the passage of the Interstate Com-
merce Act.'' 1 
More recently, Gabriel Kolko finished an examination of federal regula-
tion from 1877 to 1916, which concentrated on the machinations and mo-
tives of railroad leaders. The railroads were ruining themselves by cut-
throat competition, Kolko argued; and hence they actually sought govern-
ment regulation to stabilize their industry and to make it more profitable. 
He amply demonstrated that many railroad men both accepted the premise 
of federal regulation and strongly supported certain proposed laws. Al-
though railroad managers were obviously not alone in urging federal action 
and often disagreed among themselves, Kolko maintained that ttthe rail-
This article received the OAH's Pelzer Award for 1967. Mr. Purcell is assistant professor 
of speech in the University of California, Berkeley. 
1 lee Benson, Merchants, Farmers, & Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New Y 01'k 
Politics, 1850-1887 (Cambridge, 1955), 212. 
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roads, not the farmers and shippers, were the most important single advo-
cates of federal regulation from 1877 to 1916."2 
It was t<businessmen" and not ttthe people" or ttfarmers" who were the 
most important advocates of federal regulation, Benson and Kolko agreed; 
but, of course, they disagreed over which businessmen were most important. 
Other historians, examining the role of businessmen in the nineteenth cen-
tury, have generally concurred that economic changes caused by the growth 
of rail transportation forced various groups to support federal regulation. 8 
A study of the relationship between the competitive economy of the late-
nineteenth century and the ideas of American businessmen would clarify 
the attitude of various groups toward government regulation as well as 
suggest more accurately the meaning and importance of the Interstate Com-
merce Act. Obviously, nonbusiness groups endorsed and influenced legisla-
tion for their own motives; but the purpose here is to examine only the 
reaction of American businessmen to the railroad problem and to relate 
their responses to the complexity of the economic system in which they 
were caught. 
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, American businessmen 
operated in an impersonal economic structure. In order to meet their com-
petition, individuals whose businesses depended on shipping goods had to 
control as much as possible their major transportation connections. The 
rapid and far-reaching railroad system, which had developed after the Civil 
War, altered older economic relationships and placed many businessmen at 
a competitive disadvantage. The railroads, for example, diverted much 
trade from the water routes that followed the Great Lakes and the Erie 
Canal, and deprived merchants along the waterway of much of the busi-
ness they had previously en joyed. 4 In addition to disrupting trade channels, 
the roads offered cheap, long-haul transportation that enabled distant mer-
chants to compete with smaller businessmen who had earlier been able to 
control their local markets. Flour millers in St. Louis and Chicago, for in-
stance, took advantage of low through-rates in order to compete for south-
ern markets. Millers in Nashville, a local center, lost much of their market, 
2 Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 (Princeton, 1965), 3. 
3 See below, and especially Edward Chase Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation: A 
Study in New England History, 1820-1900 (2 vols., Cambridge, 1948), I, 496, 503-04, 
507-08, 514, 517, 523; Charles N. Glaab, Kansas City and the Railroads: Community Policy 
in the Growth of a Regional Metropolis (Madison, 1962), chapters I and II, and 174-75, 
189-92; Gerald D. Nash, "Origins of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," Pennsylvania 
History, XXIV (July 1957), 181-90. 
4 Benson, Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads, 30-36; Frederick Merk, "Eastern Antece-
dents of the Grangers," Agricultural History, 23 (Jan. 1949), 1; Weekly Northwestern 
Miller, 21 (April 9, 1886), 350; Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: Business, 
Labor, and Public Policy, 1860-1897 (New York, 1961), 98. 
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including Atlanta, a traditional customer, and suffered greatly as a result.5 
Moreover, the complicated rate structures worked new hardships on many 
individuals and areas. The grain merchants of Pittsburgh lost much of their 
trade when the railroads began charging ten cents per hundred pounds 
more for grain from Chicago to Pittsburgh than they did on the much 
longer haul from Chicago to New York. Later, both the Pittsburgh Chamber 
of Commerce and the Grain and Flour Exchange heartily endorsed the In-
terstate Commerce Act, including the controversial long-and-short-haul 
clause.6 
Businessmen recognized the importance of the railroads, and those who 
were not in a position to influence railroad policy but who depended on 
railroad service, feared and resented the rate discriminations and the power 
that characterized the transportation system. Even Poor's Manual, a staunch 
advocate of both railroad practices and interests, admitted that the charge 
of discrimination was the major complaint made in all quarters against the 
roads.7 When the developing railroad system added the threat of potentialw 
ly ruinous rate differentials to the already highly competitive and dynamic 
economy, those businessmen who were unable to take advantage of such 
differentials began to consider the desirability of government regulation. 
That truth was further substantiated when the biggest shippers, who could 
command rebates and profit from the differentials, were almost alone in 
opposing government regulation. 8 
The widespread support for federal legislation did not mean, however, 
that most businessmen agreed on the specific type of law that was needed. 
Frank J. Firth, president of the Erie and Western Transportation Compa-
ny, implicitly recognized the diversity and conflict among businessmen 
when he testified before Senator Shelby M. Cullom's committee investi-
gating interstate commerce in 1885. Firth attempted to defend the roads 
and at the same time place them in a position superior to their many antag-
onists. "The transporter or merchant appearing before you," he politely 
told the senators, nspeaks from the narrow field of observation within 
which this modern science of division of labor has confined him. " 9 Since 
each businessman saw only the one aspect that influenced his own business, 
Firth argued, then such a man could not give a comprehensive analysis. 
Firth's obvious conclusion was that the Cullom committee should not listen 
5 House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 17 61), 51. 
r. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, 98; Cong. Record, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., 385 (Jan. 5, 
1887). 
7 Henry V. Poor, Manual of the Railroads of the United States for 1882 (New York, 
1882), ix. 
8 Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 34. 
9 Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, ·Part II (Serial 2357), 464. 
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to complaining merchants but should rely instead on railroad men-those 
who understood the whole situation and knew all of the facts necessary to 
formulate an interstate commerce law. 
Spokesmen for those businessmen who feared rate discrimination dis~ 
agreed wholeheartedly with Firth and espoused their own brand of federal 
railroad regulation. Not all of them were enthusiastic about government 
interference, but their experience told them it was necessary. William H. 
Beebe, a member of a Chicago merchant firm, represented those diverse 
shipping groups when he addressed the Cullom committee. ttWhile I do 
not lean very much toward paternal legislation on the part of the Govern-
ment," he explained, "still I am decidedly of the opinion that when the 
railroads begin to touch the point of discrimination, regulation by a com-
mission or by some other governmental agency would be beneficial.'' 10 
The question of discrimination was puzzling and complex. Railroad men 
and shippers engaged in and suffered from various planned and purposeful 
discriminations. The whole transportation system also almost unavoidably 
resulted in widespread inequalities, which were themselves unintentional 
and accidental. Geographical location, size of shipments, competition from 
other transportation systems, and varying railroad overhead all combined to 
make uniform rates an impossible goal. The new railroad network pulled 
local merchants inextricably into a complex web of trade patterns, forcing 
them to compete with distant rivals. Trade areas overlapped more and 
more until a dozen cities could serve one section of the country that had 
previously relied on one local center. 11 Individuals throughout the nation 
whose business depended on the shipment of goods had to have favorable 
transportation costs, not just for growth and profits, but for survival. 
The foundation of the transportation system lay in the five great trunk 
lines that tied the East to the West and Midwest and dominated the trans-
portation of goods in intersectional and international trade. Each directly 
connected the trans-Appalachian region with one or more of the major 
eastern seaports: Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The 
merchants in these cities engaged in a constant struggle with one another to 
protect and increase their share of the western trade, just as the trunk lines 
fought with one another over the available freight. Thus, in 1881, the New 
10 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 653. 
11 House Exec. Docs., 48 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 7, Part II (Serial 2294), 8; Kirkland, In-
dustry Comes of Age, 51, 66-68, 78, 98, 100, 126-27; House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., 
No. 46, Part II (Serial 1761), 49; House Exec. Docs., 46 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 7, Part II 
(Serial 1966), 8-10. For the fight between various localities for railroad connections see 
Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 
(New York, 1960), 234, 237, 259-61, 282-83; Earl S. Beard, "Local Aid to Railroads in 
Iowa," Iowa Journal of History, 50 (Jan. 1952), 1-34. 
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York Central cut its rates in an attempt to increase its freight and to win 
more trade for New York. The other trunk lines responded with similar 
cuts, and soon rate war followed. Businessmen in the four cities entered the 
fight immediately because they feared that their competitors would secure 
more favorable differentials.12 Both the railroads and the ports tried to 
work out agreements on differentials in the interest of peace and steady 
profits, but their failure led to constant dissatisfaction and rate-cutting. 
Conflicts even divided the interests of the trunk lines from those of their 
original terminals. The various roads found it profitable to carry goods to 
rival cities, and the merchants of the terminal cities took advantage of 
cheaper rates from other lines.18 
Edward Kemble, a Boston merchant, was typical of the businessmen who 
needed low rail rates. When the rates were temporarily disadvantageous, 
he called for government regulation to improve his competitive position. 
"Massachusetts and a good portion of New England are, in my judgment, 
to-day laboring under an outrageous railroad discrimination," he daimed.14 
The railroads were favoring New York with relatively cheap rates, Kemble 
argued, and they were thus robbing Boston of her share of the trade. Ear-
lier, when the differentials weighed against New York, the city's Chamber 
of Commerce had petitioned Congress for relief from the unjust discrimi-
nations that were injuring ttthe producing, commercial, and other interests 
of the state, and particularly those of the City of New York."10 Railroad 
executives, too, disliked the open competition and despaired at the continu-
al and debilitating rate wars. Even Albert Fink, the staunch supporter of 
private pooling, came to believe that only federal legislation could establish 
a viable pooling system. 16 
Competition among producers and shippers in the Midwest and the 
South was as sharp and unrelenting as it was in the East. Chicago and St. 
Louis, the major centers in the Midwest, had a long history of commercial 
rivalry that the advent of railroad transportation only intensified.11 They 
were challenged, however, by an increasing number of regional competitors 
12 Benson, Merchants1 Farmers, and Railroads, 29-79; Kirkland, Men, Cities, and Trans-
portation, I, 502-08, 512-16. 
13 House Exec. Docs., 45 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 32, Part III (Serial 1857), 146. 
u Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 379. 
13 Henry V. Poor, Manual of the Railroads of the United States, 1881 (New York, 1881), 
m. 
16 House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 1761), 12; D. T. Gil-
christ, "Albert Fink and the Pooling System," Business History Review, 34 (Spring 1960), 
38; Thomas C. Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Business Mind in Action (Cam-
bridge, 1953), 161-62, 165, 192. 
11 Wyatt Winton Belcher, The Economic Rivalry Between St. Louis and Chicago, 1850-
1880 (New York, 1947), especially chapters IV, V, IX, X. 
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which were anxious about their own share of the growing commerce. Kansas 
City, Louisville, Cincinnati, New Orleans, Peoria, and many other cities 
struggled for prominent places in the burgeoning commerce of the Mid-
west. Under the influence of shippers in Minneapolis and St. Paul, for ex-
ample, the Chicago, Burlington & Northern lowered rates to improve the 
competitive position of the Twin Cities against Chicago and St. Louis.18 
After 1876, merchants in Milwaukee, enjoying a rate differential over com-
petitors in Chicago, cut into their business until the latter were able to com-
mand equal rates.19 
One of the most spectacular examples of the expansion of competition 
created by railway growth centered on the lucrative trade which St. Louis 
enjoyed in Latin American products--especially sugar, molasses, crockery, 
and coffee-that were shipped through New Orleans and up the Missis-
sippi, the shortest trade route from the South. Chicago businessmen 
challenged the merchants of New Orleans and St. Louis by allying with im-
porters in Baltimore and winning the support of the trunk lines seeking 
additional westbound freight. Utilizing freight reductions from Baltimore 
of up to ninety percent, Chicago merchants were able to offer lower deliv-
ery prices on goods from Latin America and to divert the trade from New 
Orleans and the Mississippi route, thus profiting themselves, the trunk lines, 
and the Baltimore importers.20 
Businessmen in smaller cities and interior distribution points ref used to 
accept, without putting up a strong fight, the loss of trade and influence 
that the expansion of competition caused. They supported both state and 
federal regulation as a means of preserving their economic positions. The 
businessmen in Dubuque, Iowa, and other river towns led the fight for 
state regulation to protect themselves from roads offering low through-rates 
to Chicago. They received support in the interior, not so much from the 
Grangers but from the small businessmen in the prairie towns who also 
suffered from rate discriminations. Together they were able to pass the fa-
mous Iowa Granger law, bringing the roads under state control.21 In 1877, 
when the railroads imposed a temporary embargo on the city's grain, the 
Kansas City Times vigorously attacked the move as ''a vital stab at the busi-
ness interests of the city." Earlier the f ournal of Commerce, a local busi-
ness publication, had urged a federal anti pooling law to protect local 
13 Weekly Northwestern Miller, 22 (Aug. 27, 1886), 204. 
19 House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 1761), 51-52. 
20 Ibid., 52-5 3. 
21 George H. Miller, "Origins of the Iowa Granger Law," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XL (March 1954), 658-59, 664, 668, 678-80. 
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interests.22 Merchants in Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile joined forces in 
1881 to establish Alabama's first railroad commission, which they hoped 
would protect their endangered commercial positions from the consolida-
tion of local roads under the control of the Louisville and Nashville. 23 
Braxton Bragg Comer, who later led the movement for further state regu-
lation in Alabama, was himself a victim of the expansion of competition. 
Rivals in St. Louis and other northern centers had ruined his Birmingham 
milling trade and forced him out of business. 24 
Discriminatory railroad practices existed not only between competing 
businessmen in different regions but also between merchants in the same 
city or area. In New York the Chamber of Commerce opposed two key 
provisions of the proposed Interstate Commerce Act, while the members of 
the Board of Trade and Transportation supported them both. 25 The result 
of the situation, declared the president of the New York Produce Ex-
change, had been to aid certain favored merchants, who were often large 
stockholders in the roads, to the detriment of their local competitors.26 Such 
practices caused great damage to the helpless merchants, he believed, and 
were wholly unjust. Perhaps there is no stronger motivation than the com-
bination of a feeling of injustice with the fear of unpro.fitability. A Chicago 
businessman stated it clearly: "It is simply in effect letting one man steal 
another man's business.'' 21 
Rate policies often divided local businessmen in different lines of com-
merce. In Boston, for example, where most merchants who dealt in goods 
shipped by rail were angry about differentials made in favor of New York 
and other cities, the exporting merchants stood strongly in favor of the ex-
isting rates. William H. Lincoln, manager of a Boston steamship line, ex-
plained that his export trade had grown immensely after the railroads 
began shipping large quantities of goods from the West. Since the roads 
had cut the rate from Chicago to Boston on goods intended for export, 
Boston had gained an advantage over New York in the export trade. 28 
Kemble, acknowledging that exporters bene.fitted from existing rates, de-
clared that the majority of Boston businessmen were not helped by the 
22 Glaab, Kansas City and the Railroads, 176, 177. 
23 James F. Doster, Alabama's Fit'st Railroad Commission, 1881-1885 (University, Ala., 
1949), 30-31, 34-35, 180; James F. Doster, Railroads in Alabama Politics, 1875-1914 
(University, Ala., 1957), 8, 20-24. 
2
' James F. Doster, "The Conflict over Railroad Regulation in Alabama," Business His-
tory Review, 28 (Dec. 1954), 3 38. 
25 Cong. Record, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., 477, 791 (Jan. 10, 18, 1887). 
~6 Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 214. 
27 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 592. 
28 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2,357)~ 354. 
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rates. tllt is of no benefit to her merchants," he broadly declared, uit is of 
no benefit to her banks, it is of no benefit to her insurance companies, it is 
of no benefit to her real-estate interests." 29 
Again, at other times, rate differentials divided the interests of those in the 
same business. From the standpoint of the origin of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, one of the most important local conflicts existed in western 
Pennsylvania between the Rockefeller forces and the competing indepen-
dent oil producers. Through the ability to command exorbitant rebates 
from the railroads, Rockefeller was slowly forcing his rivals out of busi-
ness. In self-defense the independents joined to bring pressure on their 
congressman for government regulation of the railroads, especially for an 
antirebate law. Their campaign led directly to the introduction of John H. 
Reagan's bill into the House of Representatives in 1878.80 While that bill 
eventually became the basic House bill and was in large part made law in 
1887, it came too late for the independent oil producers who had surren-
dered to Rockefeller by 1880. 
Other business groups throughout the country joined the attack on discri-
minatory railroad practices. Merchants handling dairy goods in the north-
central states complained because they were charged much higher rates on 
butter and cheese than the merchants shipping meats or lard had to pay.81 
There seemed to be no defense against such injustices, they argued, and they 
called for federal action to end them. Steamboat operators also objected to 
the railroad practice of cutting rates to the bare minimum when competing 
with water lines. The railroads could make up their losses on noncompeti-
tive lines; the steamships could not. By such methods, explained J. B. 
Wood, an agent of the St. Louis and New Orleans Anchor Line, railroads 
tried to ruin the steamship lines. 32 Even those men engaged in the jewelry 
trade were critical of the railroads and wanted some type of regulation. 
The roads generally did not want to bother with the small but valuable 
jewelry trunks and made it very difficult for the jewelers to transport their 
goods. 33 That was unfair, the jewelers argued; they were willing to assume 
the risk for their goods, if they could only get the reasonable transportation 
services that the roads had previously refused them. 
The new system of railroad transportation not only established a wider 
sphere of competition and made advantageous freight rates a major factor in 
211 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 382. See also Cong. Record, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., 634-35 
(Jan. ;4, 1887). 
30 Nash, "Origins of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," 181-84, 189. 
31 Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 657. 
32 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 1398. 
33 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 446. 
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commercial success but also fragmented the interests of American busi-
nessmen. Gradually, businessmen made alliances on the basis of their atti-
tude toward government regulation of the railroads, each operating from 
his own motives and for his own interests. The struggle over the role gov· 
ernment should play in the railroad system divided businessmen into four 
main groups. The largest of them, composed of the men who suffered from 
unfavorable differentials, strongly urged government action to protect their 
interests or, as they phrased it, to insure the public welfare. "In our judg-
ment the time has arrived," read a statement of the Toledo Produce Ex-
change, ''when Congress should assume its undoubted right and duty to the 
whole of the country, to supervise the whole system of transportation in 
this country."34 The Peoria Board of Trade was even more specific: "The 
best method of preventing extortion and discrimination," it declared, "is 
by means of stringent laws passed by Congress.,, 35 
Often businessmen who favored strong legislation to control interstate 
commerce revealed marked antipathy to the railroads. Eastern merchants 
shared much the same attitude traditionally associated with midwestern 
farmers. The railroads "have come to the conclusion apparently that they 
are masters of the situation,,, charged James H. Seymour, representing the 
New York Mercantile Exchange, "and they treat it as if it was a business 
of their own, a private business, not a public business, and do not seem to 
regard themselves as doing business for the public." 36 James Spear, a Phila-
delphia manufacturer, took another tack, striking at an obvious failing of 
the roads. "My complaint;• he stated, ttwould be simply a general com-
plaint of bad management of all the railroads in the United States .... " 37 
The great majority of the businessmen who favored government regula-
tion gave wholehearted support to the idea of a watchdog commission that 
would be empowered to prohibit unfair railroad practices. In large part, 
general confidence in the commission system stemmed from relatively suc-
cessful experiences, especially in Massachusetts, during the previous decade. 
"It seems reasonable," remarked J. D. Seeberger, a wholesale hardware 
dealer in Des Moines, Iowa, ref erring to the commission plan, ''that, accord-
ing to the working of the commission in this State, it might operate success-
fully in an enlarged sphere."38 Businessmen wanted effective regulation, 
not some untried experiment. They felt that the commission system had 
proved itself, and they were willing to support it. 
34 Ibid., Part I (Serial 2356), appendix, 71 
35 Ibid., Part I (Serial 2356), appendix, 103. 
36 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 207. 
37 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 473 
38 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 986 
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Many businessmen disagreed about the exact amount of control that the 
commission should exercise; yet they wanted it to have enough authority to 
be effective. Many suggested that either the commission be given judicial 
powers to decide law suits brought against the roads or have its findings 
made prima facie evidence in any court of law in the nation. Few would 
have gone along with M. A. Fulton, a Wisconsin merchant, who urged that 
Congress should pass an ttabsolute law" which would establish rates 
throughout the country.39 Such a plan was much too rigid. 
A second, smaller group of businessmen took a more cautious approach. 
Their economic positions demanded some type of government regulation, 
but they were unsure as to both the type of legislation needed and all the 
ramifications of such action. t 'My opinion is that Congress should go pretty 
slow upon the subject of regulating, or attempting to regulate, freight 
rates," declared E. 0. Stanard, a St. Louis mill owner, 'tespecially at this 
time, when everything is so depressed."4° Charles Ridgely, president of the 
Springfield Iron Company, expressed the same concern that government 
action might harm business activity in general. ''Less damage to business is 
likely to occur from doing too little in the way of regulation of interstate 
commerce than from doing to much," he told the Cullom committee.41 
Still, under the circumstances, both men acknowledged the need for fed-
eral regulation. 
In spite of their fear that regulation might cause further econo~ic hard-
ships and an inbred suspicion of government interference, many business-
men allowed economic necessity to overcome most of their doubts. Brad-
street's best represented many of the businessmen in that group; and al-
though the magazine did not support the Cullom bill, it did concede that 
ttWith this demand for the passage of a national law, there exists a general 
acquiescence even on the part of railroad men themselves in the principles 
of a national railroad commission.•'42 
A third group, much smaller than the first two, formed around those men 
-predominantly railroad men and investors in weaker railroad bonds-who 
advocated government regulation not for the protection of the public but 
for the welfare of the struggling roads. James D. Furber, the manager of 
the Boston and Maine Railroad, asked Congress for a law prohibiting re-
bates. "They are very annoying in your accounts and annoying to the rail-
roads," he explained; "there is nothing fair about it to the public or to the 
39 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 1248. 
40 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 852. 
41 Ibid., Part I (Serial 2356), appendix, 65. 
42 Bradstreet's: A Journal of Trade, Finance and Public Economy, XV (Jan. 15, 1887), 
52. See also ibid., XV (Feb. 5, 1887), 98 
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railway .... " 43 W. G. Raoul, president of the Central Railroad and Bank-
ing Company of Georgia, went even further by suggesting that Congress 
should pass laws to insure fairer profits for the railroads and a just return 
on capital investments.44 Furber and Raoul drew support from such rail-
road presidents as John King of the Erie, J. C. Clarke of the Illinois Cen-
tral, Frank S. Bond of the Reading, and George B. Roberts of the Pennsyl-
vania, all of whom favored federal regulation that would aid the lines 
suffering from overexpansion and rate wars. 45 
The major railroad journals gave voice to the same demands and the 
same goals. They defended the roads as essential to the well-being of the 
American economy and argued that they deserved to be protected from 
harmful legislation. The Railway World declared that the roads had ((rend-
ered an immense amount of service to the American people, and done more 
than any other single agency to generate national prosperity." 46 Not content 
with such self-praise, the Railway Age insisted that: "The vast interests 
represented in and connected with the operation of railways are entitled not 
only to protection from injustice but to friendly fostering by the 
government." 47 The other journals took similar stands, admitting both the 
right and need for federal action, but contended that the legislation should 
help rather than hinder the railroads. 48 
Although Chauncey M. Depew of the New York Central had declared 
that ''all the leading railroad men, I think, admit the principle of govern-
ment supervision and are anxious for it," railroad men clearly disagreed 
with the type of legislation that most other businessmen had in mind. 49 The 
economic structure of late nineteenth-century America forced railroad men, 
as it had forced other businessmen, to seek the protection of the federal 
government. 50 
A fourth distinct group of businessmen rejected the idea of federal regu· 
lation of the railroads and were driven by two entirely different motives. 
One such group of men opposed railroad regulation because they thought 
that any such legislation would only aid the railroads to the detriment of 
43 Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 333. 
44 Ibid., Part I (Serial 2356), appendix, 147, 148-49, 156. 
45 James W. Neilson, Shelby M. Cullom, Prairie State Republican (Urbana, 1962), 115. 
See also Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 34-41. 
46 Railway W arid, 29 (June 20, 1885), 578. 
4
i Railway Age, 13 (June 22, 1888), 390. 
"s Railroad Gazette, 18 (Dec. 17, 1886), 874; Railway Review, 27 (Jan. 22, 1887), 46, 47. 
49 Railway Review, 27 (Jan. 8, 1887), 21. 
5
° For the types of problems railroad men faced see Julius Grodinsky, Transcontinental 
Railway Strategy, 1869-1893: A study of businessmen (Philadelphia, 1962), 226-69; Kolko, 
Railroads and Regulation, 7-20, 35; Gilchrist, "Albert Fink and the Pooling System," 24~49. 
Railroad men were not hesitant to call upon the government for help when the situation 
demanded it. See Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 192. 
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everyone else. Regulation in their minds was actually a crutch for the roads. 
Francis B. Thurber, a New York wholesale grocer who had long been in-
terested in the problems of transportation, spoke for this group when he 
told the Cullom committee that the railroads were the chief supporters of 
federal regulation: ttThe trouble is, with many railroad men who have 
failed in the tasks required of them, to pay dividends on the capitalization, 
that they want now to appeal to the Government to help them out.'' 51 He 
advised them to stay with the doctrine of competition, even though it might 
work temporary hardship on some people. A similar view was expressed by 
J. H. Walker, a Massachusetts manufacturer, who stated that ugreat injury 
. . . would be done to the country by any effort to protect the owners of the 
railroads." 52 Although they overestimated by far the number of railroad 
men who favored the final Interstate Commerce Act, Thurber and Walker 
were well aware of the attempt made by railroad men to secure the passage 
of a favorable regulatory law. 
The other group that opposed government regulation argued from both 
practical and theoretical bases; they combined the plea that the complexities 
of railroad management were beyond the competence of legislation with 
their adherence to principles of laissez faire and free enterprise. Although 
the members of that group may have believed firmly in their laissez-faire 
principles, they were also usually individuals who prospered under the sta-
tus quo-either spokesmen for companies that enjoyed profitable rate 
differentials or owners of high-dividend railroad stocks. Charles A. Pillsbury, 
one of the major and most successful shippers in the nation as well as 
one who commanded lucrative rebates, was a perfect example. uw e have 
no complaints to make," he truthfully informed the committee. 53 
Charles E. Perkins, president of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy 
Railroad, was the most outspoken member of that small but determined 
group. Not only did he refuse to admit the existence of any but the rarest 
case of railroad abuse but also he attacked just about every proposal of reg-
ulation that had been suggested. He denounced the plan of publicized rail-
road rates, denied the possible efficacy of any scheme of rate-fixing, at-
tacked uniform accounting laws, justified pools and price discriminations, 
and rejected the idea of annual railroad reports to the government. 54 
"The wisdom of any legislation which may look to changing the condi-
tions which have produced results on the whole so beneficial," he 
confidently stated, ctmay well be doubted." The real evil, he suggested, was 
51 Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 293. 
52 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 335. 
53 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 1240. 
"Ibid., Part I (Serial 2356), appendix, 216-20. 
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that an erroneous public opm1on might force the passage of laws that 
would seriously harm the whole economic structure of the nation and very 
likely lead to complete government ownership of the railroads. ((Among 
the evils of Government ownership and control," he predicted, "would un-
doubtedly be higher charges and increased taxation."55 Perkins' resentment 
against the Interstate Commerce Act died hard. Two years after its passage, 
in a pamphlet published by the C. B. & Q., he called the law unwise, im-
practical, and one of the greatest burdens under which the roads had to 
operate.56 
Perkins had one prominent counterpart. The Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle led a determined opposition against government regulation and 
defended a strict version of laissez faire. In 1874, commenting on the busi-
ness recession, it had noted: 
trade is suffering from those general sources of commercial disturbance which 
have been of ten demonstrated to be as far beyond the reach of human legisla-
tion as are the meterological [sic] forces that bring about a late spring or a wet 
summer, or a copious harvest. As the world grows wiser men are getting to rec-
ognize more and more the marvellous wisdom of the great doctrine of the 
French economists, "laissez-/ aire et laissez-passer."51 
Following its guiding principle, the Chronicle continually attacked the idea 
of government regulation of the railroads. HHardly anything can be more 
dangerous just now than any further extension of Congressional power," it 
declared in 1879; and two years later, it noted that federal regulation t'can be 
anything but a failure we have but the slightest expectation."58 When Con-
gress was preparing the final version of the Interstate Commerce Act in 
1886, the Chronicle angrily insisted that "The measure as proposed is so 
full of crudities and so totally at variance with all economic and we might 
almost say moral laws that it passes comprehension how an intelligent body 
of men can countenance or recommend certain of its provisions.'' 59 
In spite of the air of certainty and authority that marked its pages, the 
Chronicle represented only a small minority of the businessmen concerned 
with interstate transportation. Few American businessmen shared the jour-
nal's belief in the benevolent workings of laissez-faire economics, at least 
in regard to the problem of the railroads. They were much more interested 
in operating their businesses more efficiently and profitably. Most business 
groups saw government regulation as a necessary means to that end. 
55 Ibid., Part I (Serial 2356), appendix, 225. 
56 Nation, XLVIII (Feb. 14, 1889), 136-37. 
51 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 18 (May 30, 1874), 538-39. 
58 Ibid., 28 (Feb. 22, 1879); 185; ibid., 32 (Jan. 29, 1881), 112. See also ibid., 14 (Feb. 
17, 1872), 210-11; ibid., 22 (Feb. 19, 1876), 171-72. 
59 Ibid., 43 (Dec. 18, 1886), 731. 
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Businessmen showed little interest in philosophical distinctions. The great 
majority of them rejected laissez-faire economics and cared little for the 
theory of the survival of the fittest, of ten considered the basis of business 
philosophy. Hardly anyone who testified before the Cullom committee even 
mentioned the concept. Businessmen were much more concerned with the 
evils of rate discrimination, the effects of pooling, and the value of long-
and-short-haul legislation than they were with the laws of nature, the 
benevolence of competition, or the loss of an abstract liberty. The very few 
men who even made reference to the concept clearly rejected it. John H. 
Devereux, the president of the Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, & Indian-
apolis Railroad, who claimed that nabsolutely the railroad interests of this 
country are going to destruction,'' believed that regulation was necessary for 
the good of the roads. 60 The chaos in the railway industry was "not to be 
remedied by waiting upon 'the survival of the fittest.' " That ((misapplied 
phrase" had nothing to do with the condition of the railroads, Devereux ex-
plained, and was of no help in attempting to improve the situation. t(The 
law of tsurvival' may apply to animals," he emphasized, ttbut not to rail· 
roads .... "61 George W. Parker, vice president and general manager of the 
St. Louis, Alton, & Terre Haute Railroad, expressed the same pragmatic at-
titude when he said simply that ttthe theory of the tsurvival of the fittest' does 
not apply to railroads .... " 62 Parker, like Devereux, accepted the necessity 
of regulation and urged pooling as the solution to railroad conflict. Even 
Poor' s Manual, which complained of the difficulties that afflicted the roads 
in 188 5, declared firmly that the theory of survival did not work in the 
railroad business. ttRailroads," the editors argued, "unfortunately, seem to 
reverse the rule of 'the survival of the fittest,' to 'the survival of the 
unfittest.' "68 
Businessmen were thus more interested in solving particular problems 
than they were in adhering to any "business philosophy." Perhaps on a 
different issue they might have appealed to the theory of survival of the 
fittest or to the principles of free competition, but when it was clearly con-
trary to their interests they readily abandoned both of them. 64 There could 
60 Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 825. 
61 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 819 
62 Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 911. 
68 Henry V. Poor, Manual of the Railroads of the United States for 1885 (New York, 
1885)' v. 
64 Twenty years ago businessmen were of ten seen as apostles of Spencerianism and social 
Darwinism; more recent scholarship has tended to cast doubt on much of that interpreta-
tion. See especially Edward C. Kirkland, Dream and Thought in the Business Community, 
1860-1900 (Ithaca, 1956), 13-15; Irvin G. Wyllie, The Self-Made Man in America: The 
Myth of Rags to Riches (New Brunswick, 1954), 83-87; Irvin G. Wyllie, "Social Dar-
winism and the Businessman," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 103 
(Oct. 1959), 629-35. 
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be no question that the vast majority of them viewed some type of govern-
ment action as a necessity for their economic welfare. 
When Congress was seriously debating the interstate commerce bill in 
188 5 and 1886, businessmen throughout the nation supported the idea of 
regulation in overwhelming numbers. During the first session of the Forty-
ninth Congress petitions from business groups were almost unanimous in 
favoring federal action. 65 Criticism grew only after the Senate-House con-
ference had worked out a final proposal. Then, businessmen who would 
have been harmed by the specific type of regulation Congress had accepted 
protested against the offending provisions in the bill, especially against the 
antipooling and long-and-short-haul clauses.66 Since those merchants lo-
cated close to markets favored the long-and-short-haul clause, most opposi-
tion to that provision came from shippers in western cities such as Chicago 
and Springfield. 67 These opponents of the interstate commerce bill did not 
attack the idea of regulation; they complained only that certain parts of the 
bill would be harmful to their economic positions. Regulation would be 
fine, they argued, so long as it was tthelpful" regulation. 
The opposing reactions of millers in St. Louis and Minneapolis, rivals in 
the flour trade, were typical of the reactions among competing businessmen 
across the nation. Since Minneapolis had a great advantage over St. Louis 
before l 8S7, due to the availability of cheap water transportation and the 
ability of her millers to force large rebates from the competing roads, Min-
neapolis flour merchants were unanimous in attacking the conference bill-
saving special condemnation for the long-and-short-haul clauses. 68 St. Louis 
merchants, however, hoping that the new provisions would enable them to 
compete more favorably with the northern center, favored the bill and ex-
pected it to accomplish "a great deal of good." The Weekly Northwestern 
Miller, a journal of the Minneapolis milling interests, frankly summarized 
the opposing reactions by observing that the interests of the two cities 
seemed ''diametrically opposed.'' The editors were not surprised that most 
St. Louis businessmen supported the bill. 69 
Although many railroad men had supported legislation favorable to the 
roads, most of them agreed that the interstate commerce bill was not the 
65 Cong. Record, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., 344, 1011, 2023, 1684, 2899, 2783, 4073 (Dec. 
21, 1885, Feb. 1, March 4, Feb. 23, March 25, 29, May 3, 1886). 
00 Ibid., 49 Cong., 2 Sess., 350, 385, 474, 477, 511, 560, 631, 926, 1173 (Jan. 5, 8, 10, 
11, 13, 24, 29, 1887). For petitions favorable to the final act see ibid., 49 Cong., 2 Sess., 
350, 385, 598, 791(Jan.4,5,13, 18, 1887). 
67 Neilson, Shelby M. Cullom, 111. 
68 Gilchrist, "Albert Fink and the Pooling System," 47-48; Weekly Northwestern Miller, 
23 (Jan. 21, 1887), 60. 
69 Weekly Northwestern Miller, 23 (Jan. 21, 1887), 60. See also Cong. Record, 49 Cong., 
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law they had wanted. Although Kolko' s assertion that railroad men agreed 
to the principle of federal regulation is undoubtedly true, his conclusion 
that the roads favored the final bill and for the mqst part ttwelcomed the 
signing of the new railroad law'' is quite doubtful. 7° Kolko himself admits 
that John Murray Forbes and William Bliss, two leading railroad men, 
were hostile to the new act. They were not alone. The presidents of most 
roads were dissatisfied with the House-Senate compromise bill and worked 
against its passage. They focused their opposition on Congress, bringing 
special pressure to bear on their senators and representatives. The presi-
dents of all five of the Vanderbilt lines opposed the bill throughout 1887 
and into 1888.71 Jay Gould and Leland Stanford denounced it. Samuel 
Sloan, president of the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western, claimed that 
ttThe bill is impracticable and ought not to pass," while Clement A. Gris-
com, a director of the Pennsylvania, thought that there had already been 
too much legislation.72 tlThe Inter-State Commerce Bill ... ,"wrote Freder-
ick J. Kimball, president of the Norfolk and Western, "will, I think, break 
up the entire through transportation business of the country and will work 
great harm to all business interests.''78 
Moreover, the actual positions of the major railroad journals ranged 
from general dissatisfaction to bitter hostility. The Railroad Gazette, 
the least antagonistic of the major industry journals, tended to accept 
the new law but still did not like it and declared that ''it hamp~rs business 
as badly as a much severer law" and could do tta great deal of harm." 74 
Although that journal claimed that the new law could be the basis for 
something better, its whole argument was that only if the roads obeyed the 
law could they show both the legislators and the public how bad it actually 
was, and hence bring about ttsomething better ."75 
The Railway Review, which showed much less restraint in its attack on 
the new law, stated that it was passed ''by the votes of men who do not be-
lieve in it," because tttheir votes were forced from them by popular cla-
mor." Referring to charges made during debate on the bill, the Review 
agreed that members of Congress udid not like the law" and that the bill 
was one nthat nobody understood, that nobody wanted." 76 It also charged 
that ttThe bill, as it now stands, places too great, too autocratic power in 
the hands of five men, and subjects them to too severe temptations." It was 
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ttunwise and unjust." The Review went far beyond the attacks of the other 
industry journals. ''In fact, if the act had been devised by the enemies of 
the government and of the people of the United States," it declared on 
January 22, 1887, nthe most merciless malice and the most careful deliber-
ation could hardly have hit upon a measure more deadly and far-reaching 
in its effects." 77 
The other leading industry journals also expressed grave doubts and 
deep fears over the proposed measure. The Reagan-Cullom bill t'will seri-
ously jeopardize the efficiency of numerous links of the existing through 
railway systems," declared the Railway World. ((That any important move-
ment in such a direction will be a serious error can scarcely be doubted." 
The mainspring for much of the regulatory legislation, the World asserted, 
''seems to be furnished by a supposition that plans can be devised whereby 
the nation can be enriched by impoverishing the railways." "This is sorry 
work for an American congress," the JVorld concluded. 78 ''The injurious 
effects of the interstate commerce law ought to cause serious reflection on 
the part of the makers and supporters of this law," declared the Railway 
Age, which continued to oppose the act into 1888 and 1889.79 "The law 
has put a premium on reckless competition and incited all kinds of sharp 
practices" in the competitive railroad industry. ''The utter heartlessness of 
the law" marked it off from all other regulatory attempts. ttin some of its 
features the interstate commerce law defies the natural principle of justice 
and equity, and hence it cannot endure without reform." 80 Even the com-
mission which was supposed to interpret the law ttconservatively" drew 
the scorn of that journal. The members "seem to have moved with the cur-
rent of popular opinion into the feeling that the interstate commerce law 
was intended solely for the repression and punishment of the railway inter-
est," the Railway Age complained bitterly, "and not to any degree for its 
protection."f'1 
Thus there was widespread and vocal opposition to the Interstate Com-
merce Act on the part of many railroad executives. That they generally 
welcomed the bill appears doubtful. Granted, some railroad managers-for 
various reasons-did either support or accept the act. The point is that 
there was strong and determined opposition and much division of opinion. 
Railroad men were neither satisfied with the bill generally nor were they its 
strongest supporters. Very likely the great division of opinion among the 
11 Ibid., 48, 47. 
78 Railway World, 31 (Jan. 8, 1887), 27. 
79 Railway Age, 13 (Sept. 21, 1888), 601. 
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roads gave other interests a greater weight than they might otherwise have 
had against a united railroad lobby. 
Just as the railroads were not the major advocates behind the Interstate 
Commerce Act, neither were the New York merchants nor any other single 
group. Support for government regulation was, in fact, widespread among 
businessmen; and that near unanimity was more important in forcing fed-
eral action than was the endorsement by any one group. The primary dy-
namism behind the drive for regulation was the threatening pattern of eco-
nomic changes that forced most businessmen in all lines of commerce to 
seek federal intervention as a means of protecting their own individual in-
terests. The desire for economic protection was the one and only unifying 
force among those who supported regulation; and it cut across all commer-
cial and geographic boundaries and swept up the great majority of Ameri-
can businessmen into an effective movement for the assertion of their inter-
ests through the federal government. 
It was neither ((the people'' nor ttthe farmers"-nor even ''the business-
men''-who were responsible for the government regulation of railroads. 
Rather, it was many diverse economic groups in combination throughout 
the nation which felt threatened by the new national economy and sought 
to protect their interests through the federal government. Of ten they were 
unsure of the exact means to be used, but they were clear about the end 
they hoped to accomplish. The railroads were necessary for the prosperity 
of most businessmen, and they intended to force the roads to serve their 
purposes. The so-called \'business philosophy" of the late-nineteenth century 
meant little to most businessmen, at least when it conflicted with their 
practical commercial needs. ttWe are not aware that there is the slightest 
principle involved in the question," observed the Banker's Magazine in 
discussing the issue of railroad regulation; nit is one purely of self-
interest."82 Such a broad statement might perhaps be harsh, yet it surely de-
scribed the attitude of American businessmen toward the Interstate Com-
merce Act. 
82 Banker's Magazine, 42 (March 1888), 660. 
